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Eurasian Economic Commission

Legal basis:

Article 18 of Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union:

“1. The Commission shall be a permanent governing Body of the Union. The Commission shall consist of a Council and a Board.

2.The Commission shall issue decisions, dispositions and recommendations.

Decisions, dispositions and recommendations of the Council of the Commission shall be taken by consensus.

Decisions, dispositions and recommendations of the Board of the Commission shall be taken by a qualified majority or consensus.

The Supreme Council shall compile a list of sensitive issues to be resolved by the Board of the Commission by consensus.

In this case, a two-thirds qualified majority of votes of all members of the Board of the Commission shall be required.

3. The status, tasks, composition, functions, powers and procedures of the Commission shall be determined in accordance with Annex 1 to this Treaty.

4. The place of stay of the Commission shall be the city of Moscow, Russian Federation.”

  • Composition/structure:

According to the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission (ANNEX 1 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union):

  1. General provisions:

“11. The Commission shall consist of the Council of the Commission and the Board of the Commission.”

  1. Council of the Commission

“23. The Council of the Commission shall be composed of one representative from each Member State. Each representative shall be the Deputy Head of the Government of the state, duly authorised in accordance with the legislation of the state.”

  1. Board of the Commission

“31. The Board of the Commission shall be the executive body of the Commission.

The Board of the Commission shall be composed of Board members, one of whom shall be the Chairman of the Board of the Commission.

The Board of the Commission shall be comprised of representatives of the Member States based on the principle of equal representation of the Member States.

The number of Board of the Commission members and the allocation of responsibilities between the Board members shall be determined by the Supreme Council.”

“33. Members of the Board of the Commission shall be appointed by the Supreme Council for a term of 4 years with a possible prolongation of powers.”

  1. Departments of the Commission

“54. Activities of the Council of the Commission and the Board of the Commission shall be supported by the Departments of the Commission.

Departments of the Commission shall consist of officials and employees.”

Eurasian Economic Commission has two tiers: the upper tier is the Council of the Commission, while the lower tier is the Board of the Commission. The EEC also contains advisory bodies – the Departments of the Commission – in each specific policy area.

The structure of EEC resembles the composition of European Commission in a sense that both institutions have two-level structure: political level being the Council of the Commission in EEC and the College of Commissioners in European Commission, and executive body being the Board of the Commission and the cabinets, respectively. Both Commissions have advisory bodies.

However, some specificities of the structures of two institutions differ: while European Commission has a powerful President, EEC does not have a position of the President of the Commission. Secondly, while the members of the College of Commissioners are elected officials, the members of the Council of the Commission should be Deputy Heads of the Government.

The compositions of the Commissions resemble each other much because Eurasian Economic Commission is built on the model of European Commission.

  • Key functions/jurisdiction:

The primary role of the Eurasian Economic Commission is driving the integration. The important functions also are ensuring the functioning of the Union, ensuring the implementation of the Union law, preparing the Budget of the Union.

According to the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission (ANNEX 1 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union):

“1. In accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 18 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (hereinafter "the Treaty"), the Commission shall be a permanent regulating body of the Union.

The basic objectives of the Commission shall be to enable the functioning and development of the Union, as well as to develop proposals in the sphere of economic integration within the Union.”

“4. The Commission shall, within its powers, ensure the implementation

of international treaties that form the Union law.”

“5. The Commission shall act as a depositary of international treaties

within the Union and decisions of the Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council.”

“9. The Commission shall be responsible for the preparation of the Budget of the Union and reports on its implementation and shall manage funds of the Commission's budget estimate.”

  • Decision-making rules:

According to the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission, “The Commission shall, within its powers, adopt decisions with regulatory and binding effect for the Member States, organisational and administrative dispositions and non-binding recommendations. Decisions of the Commission shall form part of the Union law and shall be directly applicable on the territories of the Member States.”

The Council of the Commission adopts the decisions, dispositions and recommendations by consensus. The Board of the Commission adopts the decisions, dispositions and recommendations under qualified majority voting (two-third majority).

  • Inter-institutional dynamics and accountability:

According to the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission (ANNEX 1 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union), some of functions of the Council of Commission in relation to other EAEU bodies are:

“submitting for the approval of the Supreme Council main integration directions within the Union;

introducing to the Intergovernmental Council annual reports on the monitoring of regulatory impact assessment procedure”. This shows the inter-institutional dynamics of the Commission Council and the Councils of the Union.”

Some of the functions of the Board of the Commission in relation to other EAEU bodies are:

“implementing decisions and dispositions adopted by the Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council and decisions adopted by the Council of the Commission;

ensuring representation of the interests of the Commission in courts, including the Court of the Union”.

Both the Supreme Council and the Intergovernmental Council can issue instructions to the Commission, and in case of conflicts of the decisions of the three bodies, the decisions of the Councils prevail over those of the Commission.

According to the Article 12 of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, Supreme Council “approves the composition of the Board of the Commission, distributes responsibilities among Board of the Commission members and can terminate their powers”. It also “appoints the Chairman of the Board of the Commission and decide on early termination of his/her powers”. The Board of the Commission is accountable to the Supreme Council as it can dismiss the members.

Part Two:

The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) acts as a driver of economic integration inside the Eurasian Economic Union. The institution is given a unique status of a permanent supranational body that issues the decisions binding for all member-states. However, some scholars point to the limitations of the EEC’s authority over the members, arguing that the institution is highly intergovernmental. Therefore, the power of the Eurasian Economic Commission as a driver of integration is yet to be questioned. This paper will argue that the Commission lacks supranational features and cannot act as a promoter of integration without the consent of the member-states. The authority of the EEC will be examined on the example of the conflict between Russia and Belarus over the supply of dairy products, on which the Commission tried to regulate.

The existing literature on the Eurasian Economic Union has no common opinion on the authority of the Commission and its independence from the member-states, particularly Russia. Some authors call the EEC a true and effective supranational institution and an independent promoter of integration (Ratushnyak, 2014, p.170). Literature presents several reasons that support this position: firstly, one feature of the Commission is that the Treaty on the EAEU gives the decisions of the EEC a binding effect and makes them directly applicable in the member-states (Kirkham, 2016, p.117). Secondly, many scholars claim that, although the member-states in the Union formally have equal positions, the EAEU is mainly a Russia-governed organization (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017). During the first steps of Eurasian integration the votes in the Commission of early regional blocs were distributed according to the contribution to the budget of each member-state. This made Russia the possessor of 57% of the total votes which, according to Vymyatnina and Antonova, guaranteed superiority in the decision-making process (2014, p.57). However, the creation of the EAEU introduced new rules, under which each member of both Council and Board of the Commission has one equal vote regardless of the share in the budget (Glazyev & Tkachuk, 2015, p.67). The new order of the voting in the EEC decreased the threat of Russian dominance in the decision-making since the member-states started to have equal representation inside the institution and Russia, if necessary, could be outvoted (Vinokurov, 2017, p.57; Kirkham, 2016, p.117). However, despite the mentioned advantages of the EEC, there is still a number of scholars arguing that the Commission stays under the dominant influence of Russia. Dragneva and Wolczuk provide an example of the speech of Kazakh president in which he admitted Russia’s excessive power over the EEC (2017, p.14). Another instance is introduced by Potemkina. She reports of the case when the President of European Commission decided to discuss the prospects of the relationships between the EU and EAEU with Russian government rather the EEC (2018, p.8). Although those kinds of negotiations are the responsibility of the EEC, the President of the European Commission favored Russian authorities as a representative of the whole Union. Moreover, a weakness of the Eurasian Economic Commission presented in the literature is the following: the institution is limited in the enforcement of the regulations since it has no right to initiate an infringement procedure if the member-state does not comply with the EEC’s decisions (Blockmans, Kostanyan & Vorobiov, 2012, p.16). All things considered, an analysis of the current research on the EAEU and particularly the EEC leads to no clear conclusion on the power of the Commission as a supranational institution driving the integration.

The dispute about whether the Commission has a real authority over decision-making on the matter of integration resembles the similar argument about the European Commission between scholars of different theoretical approaches. Although these theories are concerned with the European Union, the EAEU and the institutions within it could be analyzed through the same lenses. The application of one of the theories of European integration – intergovernmentalism – on the EEC could strengthen the argument that the Commission lacks supranational authority. Intergovernmentalism highlights the role of the states in the decision-making. The theory argues that the national governments, who are independent actors, control the process of integration relying primarily on the national interests (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011, p.11). Concerning particularly the European Commission, intergovernmentalists believe that the European Commission is weak on its own, rather it is influential only in the cases when “national interests converge” (Peterson, 2017, p.132). Similar argument can be made regarding the Eurasian Economic Commission which seems to lack the supranational authority, formally given to it by the Treaty, and be highly affected by the member-states’ interests.

There is an opinion that the EEC remains an intergovernmental institution and cannot act independently in decision-making on integration process (Karliuk, 2015, p.10). The first point emphasizing an important role of the member-states in the decision-making is the right for veto (Dragneva, 2013, p.55; Roberts & Moshes, 2016, p.548). According to the Regulation on the Eurasian Economic Commission (Annex 1 to the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union), the upper tier of the EEC – the Council of the Commission – decides under a consensus rule (2014). This means, as noted by Podberezkin and Podberezkina, that any decision of the EEC can be blocked by a veto of any member-state, if this decision contradicts its national interests (2015, p.54). Therefore, no decision on the further integration can be made without the consent of all the members. The power for veto gives the member-states control over the entire decision-making on integration as well as other substantial matters, which takes place in the Council of the Commission. Such a feature of the right for veto has been already admitted by the government of the Republic of Belarus, which suggested to restrict the domains in which veto can be used in the EAEU institutions (“Belorussiya predlozhila organichit parvo veto v Evraziyskom economicheskom soyuze” [“Belarus proposed to restrict the right for veto in the Eurasian Economic Union”], 2019). During the discussion of this proposal, the President of the EEC mentioned that giving up of this right by national authorities would strengthen supranational nature of the Commission (“Strany EAES obsudyat vozmozhnost otkaza ot prava veto po ryadu voprosov” [“The EAEU member-states will discuss the possibility of giving up the right for veto on certain topics”], 2020). However, at the current moment the opportunity to veto the EEC’s decisions highlight an intergovernmental nature of the Commission.

Secondly, the independence of the EEC is restricted by the ability of the member-states to contest the decisions of both the Council and the Board of the Commission in the higher-level institutions of the Union. EAEU scholars informally call this system “the Belarusian elevator” (Karliuk, 2015, p.10; Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, p.15). Under this system, even if the Commission makes a decision, the final say lies with the national governments. The reason is the following: the higher bodies of the EAEU are intergovernmental, therefore, if a disagreeing member-state appeals to the those, the right of decision-making moves to the member-states themselves (Karliuk, 2015 p.10). Lastly, the EEC lacks supranational features because it has no any means to ensure the implementation of their directives (Roberts & Moshes, 2016, p.548; Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017, p.16). If the member-state fails to comply with the Commission’s decision, the institution can issue notification to the state, however, at this step its power ends. The EEC is not able to bring the member-state in front of the Court, starting an infringement procedure, and the state cannot be fined for non-compliance (Roberts & Moshes, 2016, p.549). The last two points show that the Commission has a limited power to influence the member-states, which remain ultimate decision-makers.

The lack of the Commission’s authority over the member-states can be observed on the example of the so-called “milk war” between Russia and Belarus – two of the EAEU members. Starting from 2017, Russia restricted the supple of dairy products from Belarus, arguing that Rosselkhoznadzor – the Russian State Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision – repeatedly finds harmful chemicals in Belarusian milk products (Smirnov, 2018). The Republic of Belarus disagreed with the actions of Rosselkhoznadzor, accusing it of “unfair claims” (Mazol, 2018). As a result, the state appealed to the Eurasian Economic Commission for the regulation on this matter. The EEC concluded that Russia violated the obligations within the functioning of internal market and issued the decision notifying the Russian Federation on the necessity to comply with the Union rules (Decision of the Collegium of the Eurasian Economic Commission No. 181, 2018). Although the ban was lifted, after a certain period of time the Russian government placed the restrictions on the import of Belarusian dairy products again. As a response, the Belarusian side again appealed to the Commission, which issued another decision on Russian non-compliance with obligations on the internal market (Decision of the Collegium of the Eurasian Economic Commission No. 11, 2019). The Decision was issued on the 22nd January of 2019, however, later during 2019, in May, Russia lifted its ban for one day, after which it imposed even stricter restriction on the milk products imported from Belarus

(“ ‘Molochnaya problema’ Rossii i Belorussii – nereshayemiy konflikt interesov” [“ ‘Milk problem’ of Russia and Belarus – unsolvable conflict of interests”], 2019). As the similar ban was introduced by Russian government in the past, particularly in 2009, the observers started to call the continuous conflict between two countries a “milk war” (Romashenko, 2013).

The instance of the milk war represents an evidence for the weakness of the Eurasian Economic Commission as a supranational institution. Russia’s violation of the obligations as a Union member as well as the state’s ignorance of the Commission’s acts regulating on the matter of the conflict demonstrate how Russia decides on its own even in the areas where the EEC has specific regulations. Russia acts as an independent and ultimate decision maker in the process of integrating the markets with Belarus, showing the importance of national governments in the decision-making of the Union – the point argued by intergovernmentalists. Secondly, this situation is a clear example of how the lack of the enforcement capacities undermine the supranational status of the EEC. The Republic of Belarus repeatedly sent the requests to the Commission, however, Russia either ignored the institution’s decisions or relaxed its restrictions for a short period of time only, later imposing them again. This displays the weakness of the EEC’s authority since it cannot ensure state’s compliance with given regulations. If the member-state decides not to follow the Commission’s instruction, it can do so without being penalized. Although Belarus engaged the EEC in the conflict in order to influence Russian authorities, the decisions of the Commission did not solve the existing argument and did not manage to influence Russian’s restrictions. Ultimately, the member-state, Russia in this case, can control the extent to which it wants to integrate in a specific are.

Overall, the Eurasian Economic Union is a relatively young bloc and the success of the integration inside the Union is a point of ongoing debates. One of the issues under the continuous discussion is the power of the EAEU’s institutions, one of them being the Eurasian Economic Commission which plays the role of the main driver of integration. Although the Commission has been created as a supranational institution, there is a considerable evidence that the body remains intergovernmental and the decision-making of the EEC depends primarily on the interests of the member-states. Analyzed through the framework of intergovernmental theory of integration, the Commission appear to lack supranational features. This is due to the member-states’ right to veto the Commission’s decisions as well as to appeal to the higher bodies in the case of disagreement with the institution’s regulations. Moreover, the EEC’s inability to initiate an infringement procedure allows the states to refrain from some of the Commission’s decisions. This is demonstrated on the case of the “milk war” between Russia and Belarus where Commission has failed to influence the Russian government. Considering the circumstances, the Eurasian Economic Commission has not yet become a powerful supranational body and is not able to act independently as a driver of integration.

References

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Belorussiya predlozhila organichit parvo veto v Evraziyskom economicheskom soyuze” [“Belarus proposed to restrict the right for veto in the Eurasian Economic Union”]. (2019, May 13). Vedomosti. Retrieved from https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/news/2019/05/13/801181-belorussiya-ogranichit-veto

Blockmans, S., Kostanyan, H., & Vorobiov, I. (2012). Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The challenge of integration and unity (No. 75). Centre for European Policy Studies. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190294

Dragneva, R. (2013). The legal and institutional dimensions of the Eurasian Customs Union. In R. Dragneva & K. Wolczuk (Eds.), Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (pp. 34-60). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2017). The Eurasian Economic Union: Deals, Rules and the Exercise of Power. Retrieved from Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/eurasian-economic-union-deals-rules-and-exercise-power

Glazyev, S., & Tkachuk, S. (2015). Eurasian economic union: Achievements and prospects. In P. Dutkiewicz & R. Sakwa (Eds.), Eurasian Integration – The View from Within (pp. 61-83). Routledge.

Karliuk, M. (2015). The Eurasian Economic Union: An EU-like legal order in the Post-Soviet space? (No. WP BRP 53/LAW/2015). National Research University Higher School of Economics. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2664519

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